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This paper presents a dynamic model of risk-averse producers’ decision to invest in physical 
capital and to export. The model features irreversible investment, no capital markets and fixed 
and sunk costs to export. Several features of the distribution of investment rates and export 
participation patterns observed in firm-level data are closely matched in a calibration exercise. 
Counterfactual experiments show that large adjustments in total sales associated with entry 
into foreign markets increase the volatility of total sales for exporting firms. 
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Investment in physical capital and exporting are both extremely important activities for a rm.
Because investment provides a strong indicator of a rm's growth potential and exporting implies
an ability to compete in global markets associated with high productivity, rms are often judged
by their performance on these two dimensions. Although there is a substantial body of research
focusing on each activity independently, there are almost no studies that consider the two in a unied
model. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by developing a model of the joint exporting and
investment decisions in an environment that seeks to approximate features of the capital markets
faced by rms in developing countries. I use a calibrated version of the model to examine whether
exporting increases the volatility of rm-level sales or not. This is an important issue in light of the
increasing concern among the public and policymakers that individual producers' greater exposure
to globalization has rendered them more volatile and vulnerable to external shocks.
Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard et al. (2007a) and several other studies nd that in almost
all countries, industries and time periods, exporters constitute a minority among manufacturing
rms. These studies also show that a rm's exporting status is quite persistent over time, and
that exporters tend to be larger and more productive than rms that sell only in the domestic
market. These features are also present in the the dataset of Colombian manufacturing rms1 used
for the calibration, which is described in more detail in Section 3. Only 19% of the rms in the
sample export, but the probability that they will continue exporting the following year is about
0.88. Moreover these rms are about four times larger and exhibit twice as much sales volatility as
domestic rms. To reproduce these stylized facts, heterogenous-rms models of trade assume the
existence of signicant xed and sunk costs associated with exporting2.
Figure 1 presents a basic histogram of investment rates for machinery and equipment for Colombian
manufacturing rms. Three important stylized facts emerge from inspecting Figure 1 and Table 1:
(i) Colombian manufacturing rms seldom divest capital by selling it in secondary markets. (ii) For
a large number of (rm-year) observations investment rates are smaller than 1%, which means that
investment inaction is quite common across rms. (iii) On the other hand, there is also a signicant
1Although the information in this dataset is available at the plant level, I will use the term \rm" to maintain
consistency throughout the paper.
2These costs include setting up a distribution network abroad, adjusting product characteristics to comply with
foreign regulations, gathering market-specic information, etc.
1Figure 1: Investment Rate Distribution - Data
Source: Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey.
Table 1: Investment Moments - Colombian Manufacturing Survey, 1981-1991.
Statistic All Domestic Exporters
Firms
Fraction of obs. with i=k < 0 0.041 0.041 0.042
Inaction Rate (ji=kj  1%) 0.271 0.316 0.082
Investment Spikes (i=k  20%) 0.264 0.249 0.330
Source: Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey, 1981-1991.
number of observations featuring intensive adjustment of capital stocks (investment spikes)3. Like
the literature on the decision to export, research on investment seeks to identify what type of
adjustment costs help to explain these investment patterns4. However, the striking dierences
between exporters and domestic rms across these dimensions have not been documented before.
As Table 1 shows, exporting rms engage in signicant investment activity, since they are more
3These stylized facts have also been documented by Doms and Dunne (1998) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006),
among others.
4Installation disruptions, capital indivisibilities, retraining and restructuring costs, transaction costs, etc.
2likely to experience investment spikes and less likely to experience periods of inaction.
In this paper I set up and calibrate a partial equilibrium model that can match the stylized facts
about exporting and investment described above. Furthermore, I use the quantitative model to
understand how the decision to become an exporter aects rm-level sales volatility. The model
features heterogeneous, risk-averse rms that operate in an environment characterized by rm-
specic uncertainty (in terms of productivity and destination-specic demand shocks), irreversible
investment and no capital markets. As in most heterogeneous-rm models of trade, exporting is
costly. Domestic rms that decide to start exporting need to incur an up-front sunk cost as well
as a xed participation cost every period that they maintain a presence abroad. The capital
accumulation problem of rms is less standard, and aims to approximate conditions faced by
rms in developing countries. The assumption that rms are risk-averse can be rationalized by
thinking of rms owned by entrepreneurs who work in their own rms and whose main source of
income is the rm's dividends as in Bond et al. (2008)5. The second key assumption regarding
the rm's investment problem is that capital is perfectly irreversible as in Veracierto (2002). That
is, once a rm has installed capital it can only divest it by letting it depreciate, since it cannot
be freely disposed of or sold in a secondary market. Caballero (1993) notes that because of the
relatively small size of the manufacturing sector and highly volatile macroeconomic environment,
secondary markets for capital goods are particularly thin in developing countries. Gelos and Isgut
(2001) provide support for this view and show that investment irreversibility is a more important
component of capital adjustment costs in developing countries like Mexico and Colombia than in
developed economies such as the United States or Norway. Given that I am restricting the sources
of funds available for rms to nance capital accumulation, it is natural to restrict the secondary
market for capital goods as well. This characterization of capital markets shuts down mechanisms
other than exporting that rms could potentially use to stabilize their sales.
From a quantitative standpoint, the model performs quite well. Even though it is only calibrated
to match export entry and exit rates and the average exports-sales ratio, the model closely approx-
imates the share of investment inaction episodes and spikes for both domestic and exporting rms.
5Maloney and Azevedo (1995) note that in developing countries it is common for rm managers to own large
shares of the rms they run. Even in a developed economy like the United States, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen
(2002) nd that around 75% of all private equity is owned by households for whom it constitutes at least half of their
total net worth.
3The model also reproduces the size and volatility premium of total sales for exporting rms. The
implied costs to start exporting that result from the calibration are in line with previous estimates
by Alessandria and Choi (2007), Das et al. (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008), although the xed
cost required to remain an exporter is substantially higher than what these authors report. The
main shortcoming of the calibrated model is the fact that new exporters adjust the amount of
output they choose to sell abroad immediately upon entry, contrary to the ndings of Eaton et al.
(2008) and Ruhl and Willis (2008), which show that new exporters tend to start out by selling
small quantities, and only increase their exports if they are successful.
After calibrating the model, two important results emerge. The rst is that despite the assumption
that rms are risk-averse, deriving higher utility from more stable prots, their export decision is not
strongly aected by the correlation of idiosyncratic demand shocks when rm-specic productivity
is highly persistent. In fact, given the highly-persistent productivity process used in the calibration,
increasing the correlation between domestic and foreign demand shocks induces more rms to start
exporting. The reason behind this pattern is that productivity's persistence has a strong positive
eect on the value of exporting for rms. Firms can safely expect that the positive productivity
shocks that induce them to start exporting will take a long time to dissipate. Under these conditions,
positively correlated demand shocks facilitate entry into the export market, trumping the positive
eect that the high correlation of demand shocks might have on the volatility of prots. However,
when the persistence of the productivity process decreases, demand shocks and their correlation
structure become more important determinants of the decision to export. Thus, reductions in
demand correlation have a positive impact on the number of exporting rms.
The second nding pertains to the eect that exporting has on rm-level sales volatility. Using
the calibrated model, I conduct two counterfactual experiments: in the rst one, I shut down the
foreign market so that all rms are restricted to selling in the domestic market alone. The second
experiment looks at the opposite situation, where the xed and sunk costs associated with exporting
are set equal to zero, so all rms nd it optimal to export6. Comparing these two scenarios with
the benchmark calibration shows that exporting increases rm-level sales volatility. The larger
adjustment of total sales that rms undertake when entering the foreign market in response to the
xed and sunk costs results in higher rm-level sales volatility relative to the two counterfactual
6I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this experiment.
4scenarios.
This paper builds upon the quantitative models of a rm's decision to export in the presence
of sunk entry costs developed by Roberts and Tybout (1997), Alessandria and Choi (2007), Das
et al. (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008), but goes beyond these studies by also considering the
rm's decision to investment in physical capital as in Veracierto (2002), Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), Khan and Thomas (2008) and several other papers reviewed in Caballero (1999). This
paper considers the joint nature of the exporting and investment decision in a unied environment,
thus bringing together these two literatures. Although xed and sunk costs to serve the foreign
market are a staple of heterogeneous-rm models of international trade, almost all these models,
with the exception of Alessandria and Choi (2007) and Suwantaradon (2008), ignore the capital
accumulation decision of rms7.
A second contribution of this paper is to provide a better understanding of how trade openness
aects rm-level volatility. Comin and Philippon (2005), probably the most cited work studying
rm-level sales volatility does not take into consideration the eect of changes in trade openness.
This research topic has also been overlooked in the international trade literature until very re-
cently8 To the best of my knowledge, there are only two recent papers that study how exporting
aects rm-level volatility9. Buch et al. (2009) use rm-level data from the German state of
Baden-W urttemberg and nd that controlling for rm size and productivity, exporters have lower
sales volatility than non-exporters. However, their empirical analysis does not identify the specic
mechanisms that drive their result. On the other hand Vannoorenberghe (2010) develops a partial
equilibrium model of heterogeneous rms, where demand shocks determine a rm's decision to
become an exporter. Testing the model's predictions using a panel of French rms, he nds that
the eect of exporting on rm-level sales volatility depends crucially on the share of output that
rms sell abroad, with large exporters having more volatile sales than domestic rms. While in
7However, neither of these papers addresses the substantial degree of lumpiness and high frequency of inaction
observed in plant-level investment.
8Early theoretical contributions by Clark (1973), Eldor and Zilcha (1987), Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) among
others, study the export supply decision of risk-averse monopolists and perfectly competitive rms, and how this
decision is inuenced by exchange rate volatility. These studies did not consider rm heterogeneity or entry and
participation costs to start exporting. On the empirical side, Hirsch and Lev (1971), using a small sample of rms in
Denmark, Israel and The Netherlands, nd that international diversication is positively correlated with total sales
stability.
9At the three-digit industry level di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) nd that sectors that are more open to
international trade are more volatile.
5Vannoorenberghe's model all rm-level decisions are static, the model developed in this paper is
fully dynamic, in the sense that a rm's recursive problem is explicitly solved. This is an important
distinction since it allows me to show that the adjustment of sales and capital in the transition
towards exporting results in higher sales volatility for exporters. The paper is organized as follows:
section 2 outlines the theoretical model, sections 3 and 4 describe the calibration strategy and the
benchmark results respectively. Section 5 presents the counterfactual experiments, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Model
This is a partial equilibrium model of an industry populated by heterogeneous rms. There is a
xed number10 of risk-averse rms, each of which produces a dierentiated product, maximizing










with  2 (0;1),  > 0 and u() = ln() if  = 1. All rms have access to the same technology,
which uses capital as the only input to produce a nal good11:
q = ek;  2 (0;1): (2)
where k is the rm's capital stock and  is a rm-specic productivity index that follows a Markov
process, 0 = % + 0, with % 2 (0;1) and 0 i:i:d:  N(0;2
), where a 0 denotes the next-period value
for the variable of interest. Capital stock is owned by the rm and is augmented through investment
that comes from internal funds. Since capital markets are non-existent, the rm cannot borrow to
nance capital investment. A rm's capital stock follows the law of motion,
k0 = (1   )k + i; (3)
10The model abstracts from entry and exit into and out of the domestic market.
11Alternatively, one could assume a technology that uses both capital and labor, where labor is a fully exible
input. The main results of the model remain unchanged.
6where i denotes gross investment and  is the depreciation rate of capital. At period t the rm
chooses the capital stock that will be available for production in period t + 112. Furthermore
investment is assumed to be perfectly irreversible, which implies that gross investment is constrained
to be non-negative.
Firms' output can potentially be sold in two markets: Home (h) and Foreign (f). The dierence
between the two is that it is costly for a rm to sell its output in the foreign market. A rm
that decides to start exporting has to pay a sunk cost, sx. Additionally, and independently of its
previous exporting status, a rm that exports in any given period has to pay a xed participation
cost, fx. Both costs are denominated in units of capital. If rms only had to pay a xed cost per-
period to sell abroad, the only determinant of the decision to export would be current protability
in the foreign market, which means that if current foreign prots were to fall below xed costs,
the rm would stop exporting. The existence of sunk entry costs makes the rm's export decision
forward-looking. Current exporters know that if they stop exporting today, they will have to pay
sx whenever they decide to sell abroad again. Alternatively, they can choose to weather the rough
times and avoid paying the sunk cost. The problem for domestic rms is to determine when to
exercise the option to become exporters. If productivity (or foreign demand) is not suciently high,
they might choose to wait until conditions improve. The high turnover rates observed in export
markets justify including the xed per-period cost in addition to the sunk cost to start exporting.
Since the Cobb-Douglas production function assumed in the model implies that gross potential
export prots are always positive, not including the xed participation cost would result in rms
never exiting the export market13. Let y denote the export status of a rm, with y = 1 if the rm
decides to export and 0 otherwise. Also, let y 1 denote the rm's export status in the previous
period. Then the cost of exporting for a rm is given by:
Cx(y 1;y) = sx[I(y = 1jy 1 = 0)] + fx[I(y = 1jy 1 = 1)]; (4)
where I() denotes the indicator function. A rm faces the following demand curve for its output
12Thus, investment at t completely determines the production possibilities of the rm at t+1. This contrasts with
the model of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) where there is a market in which rms can rent capital to/from other rms.





i:i:d:  N(j   2
j=2;2
j); j = h;f:
where  > 1 is the elasticity of demand, which is assumed to be the same across markets and zh
and zf are rm-destination specic demand shocks, which are assumed to be independent over
time. Demand shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other in the benchmark model
used in the calibration. In Section 4, I explore how the correlation of demand shocks aects rms'
exporting decisions. Domestic and foreign markets are assumed to be segmented, allowing rms to






j ; j = h;f; (6)
and total prots are given by:
 = rh + y[rf   Cx(y 1;y)]   i: (7)
Firm's Problem
The problem of the rm can be partitioned into two subproblems: a dynamic one that involves the
decision of whether or not to export and how much capital to use in the next period, and a static
one which entails deciding how much output to produce for each market, conditional on the rm
deciding to export. The timing of actions is as follows, and is illustrated in Figure 2:
1. A rm enters period t with a given capital stock kt and last period's export status yt 1 2
f0;1g. Demand shocks zft and zht and rm-specic productivity t draws are realized at the
beginning of the period.
2. The rm decides whether to export or not. If the rm did not export in the previous period,
it has to pay a sunk cost sx to break into the foreign market in period t. A rm that is
currently servicing the foreign market needs to pay a xed costs, fx every period it exports.
Conditional on deciding to export, a rm chooses the fraction  2 [0;1] of its capital stock to
8use for production for the domestic market.
3. Finally, the rm chooses its desired capital stock for period t + 1. Prots for period t are
realized.
Figure 2: Sequence of Actions
Firms start period t with capital stock 
kt and exporting status yt-1
Firm-destination specific shocks
Zt ≡ (zht zft) and productivity shock φt
are realized
t
Choose share of capital θt , 
to produce for the domestic 
market
Choose kt+1 and yt. Pay 
corresponding fixed and/or 
sunk costs of servicing the 
foreign market
t+1
Since a rm's capital stock in period t is the result of the rm's decision at t   1, the timing
assumption implies that output is chosen before the resolution of uncertainty, but the allocation of
sales between the two markets is decided ex-post. This implies that a rm has greater exibility in
adjusting the distribution of sales across dierent markets than it does in changing the total scale
of its production.
An individual rm's state variables can be divided into two separate categories: endogenous in-
dividual states, capital stock, k, and export status, y 1, and exogenous individual states, which
include rm-specic productivity, , and rm-destination specic demand shocks, Z  [zh zf].
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where E[0;Z0] denotes the conditional expectation over future productivity and demand shocks
and the constraint that future capital has to be greater than or equal to current capital net of
depreciation captures the irreversibility of investment. To solve the problem dened in equations
(8)-(10), I discretize the state space and use a value function iteration algorithm. Productivity
shocks are approximated using the method of Tauchen (1986) in a 15-point grid and demand
shocks are approximated using a Gaussian quadrature procedure with 5 nodes for each shock.
The solution to this problem results in two policy rules, one for next-period's capital, gk(k;y 1;;Z),
and the other for exporting, gy(k;y 1;;Z) 2 f0;1g. Figure 3 shows the decision rule for next-
period's capital for both exporters and domestic rms for two dierent levels of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, given the same rm-destination specic demand shocks. Under risk neutrality and no
adjustment costs, next-period capital would be independent of current capital. Under these circum-
stances, investment would be excessively responsive to productivity shocks and the model would
not be able to reproduce the high inaction rates observed in the data. Adding risk aversion dampens
the response of investment to productivity shocks, since large changes in the capital stock reduce
the expected utility of prots. In this case, the capital accumulation policy rule is an increasing
function of current capital, and is similar to the policy rule for a risk-neutral rm with convex
capital-adjustment costs. Firms accumulate more capital during periods of high productivity and
when they export. Adding risk aversion, however, is still not sucient to produce the investment
inaction and spikes observed in the data. Assuming that investment is perfectly irreversible bridges
this gap. As Figure 3 shows, rms that have accumulated high levels of capital cannot divest their
capital stock in response to adverse conditions, all they can do is to let it depreciate. This sub-
stantially increases the likelihood of observing episodes where optimal investment is zero. On the
10other hand, as noted by Caballero (1991), the presence of irreversibilities makes investment more
responsive to \good" (realizations in which the capital in place is lower than the desired stock of
capital) than to \bad" shocks, since downsizing the capital stock is costlier than building it up.
When rms receive shocks that move them across the threshold to start exporting, their current
capital stock is often substantially below their desired capital stock given the larger demand they
now face, thus producing a signicant number of investment spikes.
Figure 3: Capital Policy Rule

























Figure 4 shows the contour lines of the exporting policy rule for domestic rms and current exporters
given the mean value for demand shocks in both markets. As Baldwin and Krugman (1989) note,
under the existence of a sunk entry cost to access the export market, a rm needs to take into
consideration that in later periods it can continue exporting without incurring this cost again14.
This will aect the expected present discounted utility of prots, generating hysteresis. If, for
instance, a rm decides to start exporting after a positive foreign demand shock, the rm will
continue to export even after the foreign demand returns to its pre-shock level. For a given level
of productivity, the policy rule for exporting is characterized by two cuto levels of capital, k < k,
14Roberts and Tybout (1997) nd evidence of non-zero entry costs into foreign markets for manufacturing plants
in Colombia. They also nd that plants that have not operated in the export market for two years or more face
re-entry costs that are not signicantly dierent from the entry costs faced by plants that have not exported before.
This is why I assume that a rm that stops exporting has to pay the sunk entry cost whenever it decides to start
exporting again, regardless of its previous exporting experience. This assumption greatly simplies the solution of
the dynamic problem of the rm.
11such that a rm currently producing only for the domestic market would decide to start exporting if
its capital stock is above k, while an exporting rm whose capital stock falls below k would choose
to exit the foreign market. Similarly, for a given capital stock, the level of productivity that would
induce a domestic rm to enter the export market is always greater than the level that would cause
an exporter to drop out the foreign market. It follows that rms with capital stocks and productivity
between the two thresholds can potentially be domestic rms or exporters depending on the history
of the shocks they have received. The hysteresis generated by the the sunk cost to enter the foreign
market has important implications for the volatility of sales. If sunk costs are signicant, exporters
will be reluctant to exit the foreign market when foreign demand is unfavorable and/or productivity
falls. Exporters that have experienced prolonged spells of low demand or productivity, and whose
capital is signicantly below their desired level when conditions turn around, have the incentive to
incur in substantial bursts of investment. These dramatic changes in the level of the capital stock
of exporters would be reected in higher sales volatility than that experienced by domestic rms.











30 Cutoff to Start Exporting
Cutoff to Stop Exporting
The static problem of how much output to export, conditional on the capital stock and the real-



















The key variables that determine the fraction  of capital used in the production for the domestic
market are the relative magnitudes of domestic and foreign demand shocks. When the size of the
foreign market increases relative to that of the domestic market,  decreases. Assuming that the
demand elasticity is the same in both markets also implies that  is independent of the capital
stock.
3 Calibration
Table 2 presents the parameters used in the benchmark solution of the model. The model period
is set to one year. The coecient of relative risk aversion, discount factor, depreciation rate and
capital's share of output are standard in the macroeconomics literature. The discount rate  = 0:90
implies an annual real interest rate of 11%, which is higher than the usual 4% based on the US real
interest rate. The depreciation rate is set to 6.9% annually as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)15.
The coecient of relative risk aversion of 1 implies a logarithmic utility of prots. In Section 4, I
show how the decision to export is aected by changes in the rms' degree of risk aversion.
The elasticity of demand is assumed to be the same in both markets and is set to 3.8 as in
Bernard et al. (2007b) based on estimates for the elasticity of substitution across varieties in a
monopolistic competition environment (in this setting, and assuming CES preferences, the elasticity
of substitution coincides with the elasticity of demand faced by individual rms), which in turn is
very close to the median of the estimates that Broda and Weinstein (2006) nd for 7-digit industries
in the United States.
The plant-level data used for the calibration of parameters comes from Colombia's Annual Man-
ufacturing Survey conducted by the Colombian Statistical Agency (Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estad stica, DANE). The data covers all manufacturing plants with 10 or more em-
ployees for the period 1981-1991. I work with a balanced panel of all continuing plants in the
sample. All investment gures correspond to investment in machinery, transport and other equip-
15Gelos and Isgut (2001) use a similar depreciation rate of 7% for machinery and equipment in their study of
Colombian and Mexican manufacturing plants.
13Table 2: Parameters for the Baseline Economy
Parameter Description Value
 Relative risk aversion coecient 1.0
 Curvature of production function 0.36
 Discount factor 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.069
 Demand elasticity 3.8
s?
x Sunk entry cost to start exporting 0.207
f?
x Fixed cost to remain an exporter 0.104
Shocks
% Persistence productivity shock 0.961
2
 Variance productivity innovations 0.0259
h   2
h=2 Mean domestic demand shock 0
f   2
f=2 Mean foreign demand shock -4.302
2
j Variance demand shocks, j = h;f 0.0259
? Fixed and sunk costs are measured as fraction of total sales for exporters
and entrants into the foreign market respectively.
Table 3: Calibration Targets
Statistic Data Model
Starter rate 0.027 0.025
Stopper rate 0.125 0.125
Mean export-sales ratio 0.165 0.165
ment. Capital stocks are constructed following a permanent inventory method described in Roberts
and Tybout (1996). The main advantage of using this dataset is that it has been widely used to
study both the decision to export (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007; Ruhl and Willis,
2008) and capital adjustment patterns (Gelos and Isgut, 2001) at the the rm level, which makes
the results of this paper more easily comparable with the existing literature.
The parametrization of the idiosyncratic productivity process, demand shocks and the export costs
deserves more comment. The parameters that govern the productivity process % and 2
 are taken
from Ruhl and Willis (2008), who estimate these in a structural model of the decision to export
using the same data as this paper. I set h such that domestic demand shocks have mean 1, and
14the variance of domestic and foreign demand shocks is assumed to be the same as the variance of
productivity innovations. The three remaining parameters, the sunk cost to start exporting, sx,
the cost to maintain a presence in the foreign market, fx and f, the parameter that determines
the average size of foreign demand shocks, are calibrated to match three moments from the data
that characterize the decision to export: (i) the entry rate into exporting (starter rate), (ii) the exit
rate out of exporting (stopper rate) and (iii) the mean exports-sales ratio. Table 3 shows the values
of these moments for Colombian manufacturing rms and the t achieved by the calibration.
Given the calibrated values for sx and fx, domestic rms breaking into the foreign market would
expect to pay on average 20.7% of their pre-export sales as an entry cost, and exporters would
have to sacrice on average 10.42 % of their sales to maintain their presence abroad. The export
penetration costs are in line with other estimates found in the literature: Alessandria and Choi
(2007), based on their calibration for U.S. manufacturing plants, report sunk entry costs of 12.6%
of sales, and Ruhl and Willis (2008) nd a larger gure of 38.6% of the median sales for Colombian
manufacturing plants (sunk costs correspond to 27.8% of median rm sales in the calibrated model).
The cost to remain an exporter implied by the calibrated value of fx is substantially higher than
the ones Alessandria and Choi (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008) report (1.7 and 4.2% of total
sales, respectively). This is due to the assumption of risk aversion. The curvature that risk aversion
introduces into the rm's value function increases the hysteresis band relative to the case of risk
neutrality, as shown in Ria~ no (2010). Thus, a very high value of fx is needed to match the
conditional probability of exiting the foreign market. The mean of foreign demand shocks is about
one-hundredth (exp( 4:302)  0:013) of the size of the average for domestic demand shocks. The
main advantage of including idiosyncratic demand shocks is that it allows me to closely match both
the average share of total sales accounted by exports and the share of exporters in the data, even
though the last moment is not directly calibrated. This is important because as noted by Armenter
and Koren (2008), a Melitz-type model where productivity is the only source of rm heterogeneity
cannot simultaneously match these two moments16.
Table 4 shows how the model ts the data along several dimensions that have not been directly
16In a Melitz-type model, calibrating the entry and continuation costs of exporting in order to match the share
of exporting rms alone would result on mean exports-sales ratios that are too high relative to the data. Similarly,
matching the mean exports-sales ratio would necessitate relatively low xed and sunk costs, thus producing too many
exporting rms.
15Table 4: Moments Produced by the Model
Statistic Data Model
Fraction of exporting rms 0.192 0.177
Relative mean total sales, exporters 3.721 1.955
Relative total sales volatility, exporters 1.897 2.052
Mean investment rate 0.142 0.077
Domestic rms 0.134 0.070
Continuing exporters 0.169 0.087
New exporters 0.147 0.143
Exiting exporters 0.134 0.024
Fraction of obs. with ji=kj  1% 0.271 0.274
Domestic rms 0.316 0.294
Exporters 0.082 0.179
Fraction of obs. with i=k  20% 0.264 0.244
Domestic rms 0.248 0.217
Exporters 0.363 0.372
Figure 5: Investment Rate Distribution - Calibrated Model
calibrated. The model ts the data quite well. The share of exporting rms is just slightly lower
than in the data, and the fraction of inaction episodes and investment rate spikes are matched
closely. The fact that exporters are less likely to experience inaction episodes and more likely
16to present investment spikes is also captured by the model. Although presenting less dispersion,
the distribution of investment rates shown in Figure 5 looks remarkably similar to the empirical
distribution of investment rates presented in Figure 1.
4 Results
In this section, I explore in greater detail the quantitative implications of the calibrated model,
comparing them to the data, emphasizing the patterns of investment and total sales around the
time that rms decide to start exporting. In the model rms accumulate capital when either their
idiosyncratic productivity and/or domestic demand improves. Changes in idiosyncratic foreign de-
mand shocks are less important for investment since they only aect exporters and are signicantly
smaller than domestic demand shocks. Conversely, low productivity and demand realizations in-
duce rms to stop investing. Firms that have had a history of high productivity and domestic
demand shocks accumulate a substantial stock of capital which makes it protable to incur the
entry costs to start exporting. Thus it follows that exporters are 1.95 times larger in terms of
their total sales, and their sales volatility17 is 2.05 times higher than that of rms that only sell in
the domestic market. The corresponding gures for Colombian producers presented in Table 4 are
3.72 and 1.89 respectively, which shows that the model also provides a good approximation to the
exporters' size and volatility sales premium observed in the data.
Figure 6 shows the patterns of capital, investment rates and sales around the transition into ex-
porting. Firms that will start exporting in 5 years are already 8% larger in terms of capital than
the average domestic rm. Because of the smoothing of prots induced by risk aversion, rms
increase their capital stock gradually before they start exporting18, with the highest investment
rates taking place during the period two years before and after entering the foreign market, in
which close to two thirds of all investment spikes occur. This pattern has also been documented
by Iacovone and Javorcik (2009), who show that Mexican manufacturing plants are signicantly
more likely to present investment spikes one and two years before starting to export a new prod-









rt denotes total sales at time t.
18Firms starting to export are on average 33.7% larger in terms of capital stock relative to ve periods before
exporting.
17uct. Thus, the mean investment rate for new exporters is 14.3%, which is signicantly higher than
that of domestic rms and existing exporters (7.0 and 8.7% respectively), with exiting exporters
presenting the lowest investment rate of the four, 2.4%. Even though the model correctly predicts
the higher investment rates of exporters, the dierences across export statuses are starker than in
the data.
Figure 6: Selected Variables Around Entry into Export Market




































































































time around entry into export market
The solid grey line indicates the mean of the respective variable for non-exporting rms, except for exports-sales
ratio, where it indicates the mean ratio for all exporters.
Upon entry into the export market, rms' total sales increase on average 33.5 % on impact. A
similar, albeit more gradual, response is observed in the data, at least immediately after entry, with
average total sales of new exporters increasing by 20.4% after their rst year selling abroad. After
ve years exporting, total sales of these rms more than double relative to their pre-export levels,
whereas in the model sales growth after starting to export is considerably lower. This pattern also
emerges when studying the behavior of the exports-sales ratio. The share of exports on total sales
18jumps immediately to 16.8% after entry at a level 2% higher than the average exports-sales ratio
for all exporters, slightly decreasing over time as the positive productivity and demand shocks that
induced entry die out. This dynamic pattern is at variance with the ndings of Eaton et al. (2008)
and Ruhl and Willis (2008), who show that the exports-sales ratio increases gradually conditional on
survival in the foreign market. Because of the immediate adjustment of the export-sales ratio after
entry, new exporters are just 6% smaller than established exporters, but because of the hysteresis
produced by the large entry costs, they are about 17% larger in terms of sales than rms dropping
out of the export market, which are substantially larger than the average non-exporting rm19.
Since irreversibility delays the divestment of capital, it takes about 5 years for these rms to reach
a similar volume of sales as the average domestic rm.
After examining the patterns of investment and sales around entry into the export market, I study
how the correlation of demand shocks aects the export participation decision of rms. Table
5 shows how the share of exporting rms is aected by changes in the correlation of demand
shocks. The rst thing to notice is that changes in the correlation of demand shocks do not have a
signicant impact on export participation. Increasing the correlation from -0.45 to +0.45 increases
the share of exporters by only 1.6 percentage points. The second important point is that the
share of exporters increases with the correlation of demand shocks. This is the opposite of what
one would expect if rms were taking advantage of the foreign market as a means to diversify
their sales revenue. The reason behind this puzzling pattern is that the high persistence of the
productivity process dramatically increases the value of becoming an exporter. A combination of
positive demand shocks in both markets provides a stronger incentive to accumulate capital, so
when productivity improves, rms know that paying the entry cost is worthwhile, because it will
be protable to export for several periods.
Table 5: Share of Exporting Firms
corr(zh;zf)
-0.75 -0.6 -0.45 -0.3 -0.15 0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0.75
0.164 0.169 0.171 0.173 0.175 0.177 0.178 0.180 0.187 0.189 0.190
19New exporters are 24% larger than exiting exporters, and these rms are twice as big as domestic rms in terms
of their sales in the Colombian data.
19This point becomes clearer in Figure 7, which shows how the share of exporters changes for dierent
combinations of demand correlation and persistence of the productivity process, %20. In the gure it
becomes clear that when productivity is not very persistent, changes in the correlation of demand
shocks have a stronger eect on the number of rms exporting and that reducing the degree of
correlation has a positive eect on the share of exporters.












































The share of exporting rms is relative to the situation of zero demand correlation for any given level of %.
Lastly, I study how the decision to export is inuenced by a rm's degree of risk aversion. Increasing
the coecient of relative risk aversion, , from 1 to 2 induces more rms to start exporting,
increasing the share of exporting rms by 11%. This higher curvature increases the expected
utility of selling in two markets, which results in a higher mean capital stock across rms (because
of the new exporters) but has a negligible eect on the investment behavior of rms with the
fraction of inaction episodes and investment spikes both decreasing by less than 1% relative to the
20The share of exporting rms is relative to the situation of zero demand correlation for any given level of % to
facilitate the comparison, since the value of being an exporter increases with the persistence of productivity shocks,
the absolute share of exporters is substantially higher for high levels of %.
20benchmark calibration.
5 Counterfactual Experiments
To quantify the eect that exporting has on the volatility of sales, I take advantage of the calibrated
model and conduct two counterfactual experiments. In the rst one, the foreign market is shut
down, so rms do not have the opportunity to export. In the second experiment, I assume that
the xed and sunk costs of exporting are zero, so all rms export21. The comparison between the
benchmark calibration and the two counterfactual experiments is presented in Table 6.
Experiment 1: Shutting Down the Export Market
Having the foreign market available has a signicantly positive eect on the average scale of rms.
Total sales for all rms are 4.5% higher and 22% more volatile than when no exports are allowed.
Looking at the rms that would have become exporters had the option been available, it can be seen
that total sales are 16.4% lower and 12.5% less volatile. In Section 4, I showed that rms that will
become exporters are actively accumulating capital and are larger on average than non-exporting
rms. In the counterfactual, the capital accumulation pattern of these rms is quite similar to what
is depicted in Figure 6, with rms in the counterfactual scenario being just slightly smaller in terms
of capital up to the time of entry. However, when positive productivity shocks die out, rms in the
counterfactual let their capital start to fall relative to the case in which they can export. Potential
exporters would have been 3.6% larger in terms of capital two years after starting to export, and
7.2% larger ve periods afterwards had they been able to sell in the two markets. Closing down the
foreign market reduces both the occurrence of investment spikes and inaction episodes by 3.4 and
1.1% respectively. Shutting down the foreign market has two main implications for the behavior
of rms. First, it reduces the optimal scale of rms, thus reducing the incentive to accumulate
capital. Second, the lack of a second market to sell to, dampens the jump in total sales associated
with entry into exporting observed in the benchmark calibration.
21To make the second experiment comparable with the benchmark, I adjust the mean of the foreign demand shock
downwards to make sure that the mean exports-sales ratio is the same in both scenarios.
21Experiment 2: Costless Exports
In the second counterfactual experiment I set all the costs of exporting to zero so that all rms
nd optimal to sell in the foreign market. In this case, total sales are 5.6% less volatile than
in the benchmark even though mean total sales are 14% larger as all rms sell in both markets.
Firms face smaller deviations from their desired capital stocks, which reduces substantially both
the occurrence of investment spikes and inaction episodes by 22.1% and 6% respectively, relative
to the benchmark.
The contrast between the two opposite counterfactual scenarios and the benchmark case in which
selling abroad is costly, presented in Figure 8, claries the reason why exporting makes rms' sales
more volatile. The gure presents the behavior of mean total sales and sales volatility around the
time in which rms would enter the export market in the benchmark calibration. In the benchmark,
average total sales increase by 33% on impact when rms enter the export market, whereas in the
counterfactual scenarios the change in mean total sales is not as abrupt (mean total sales rise by
16 and 16.4% in experiments 1 and 2, respectively), either because there is not a second market to
enter to, or because these rms are already exporting. The larger change in sales in the benchmark
feeds into the measure of sales volatility which is on average 22% higher relative to experiment
1 and 10.8% higher compared to experiment 2. Thus, the large changes in total sales caused by
the xed and sunk costs of exporting when rms enter the export market leads to greater sales
volatility for exporting rms.
Table 6: Counterfactual Experiments (All rms)
Statistic Benchmark No Exports Costless Exports
(sx = fx = 0)
Capital 100 97.6 114.1
Mean total sales 100 95.6 113.4
Sd. total sales 100 81.8 94.6
Mean investment rate 100 99.8 98.7
Share of obs. with ji=kj  1% 100 98.8 94.0
Share of obs. with i=k  20% 100 96.7 77.9
22Figure 8: Mean Sales and Volatility across Counterfactual Scenarios

























































time around entry into the export market (benchmark)
6 Concluding Remarks
I set up and calibrate a dynamic model of a rm's decision to invest in physical capital and
to export. The model has three distinctive features: (i) rms are risk-averse, (ii) investment is
perfectly irreversible and (iii) rms face signicant costs to start exporting and maintaining a
presence abroad. The model is calibrated to match export entry and exit patterns as well as the
average share of exports in total sales for Colombian manufacturing rms. The calibrated model
replicates several characteristic moments of the distribution of investment rates observed in the
data, such as the frequency of inaction and investment spikes, quite closely, in particular the fact
that exporting rms are more likely to experience bursts of investment and substantially fewer
inaction episodes than non-exporting rms. To my knowledge, this is the rst paper documenting
how the investment behavior of rms is shaped by their decision to sell in foreign markets.
Two important contributions are derived from the calibrated model: (i) Even though rms are
assumed to be risk-averse and thus preferring more stable sales revenues, I show that the corre-
lation between demand shocks is not an important determinant of the decision to export when
idiosyncratic rm productivity is highly persistent. This conclusion is reversed when productivity's
23persistence decreases, in which case, a negative correlation of demand shocks induces more rms
to start exporting. (ii) Using the calibrated model to conduct counterfactual experiments allows
me to establish that exporting tends to make rms' sales more volatile. Comparing the benchmark
simulations with two extreme counterfactual scenarios in which either rms are not allowed to
export or all rms nd it optimal to export, shows that the large changes in total sales that occur
when rms transition into the export market are the main reason why the volatility of total sales
increases when rms decide to start exporting.
24References
Alessandria, G. and H. Choi (2007): \Do Sunk Costs of Exporting Matter for Net Export
Dynamics?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 289{336.
Armenter, R. and M. Koren (2008): \Economies of Scale and the Size of Exporters,"
Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Baldwin, R. and P. Krugman (1989): \Persistent Trade Eects of Large Exchange Rate
Shocks," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 635{654.
Bernard, A. B. and J. B. Jensen (1999): \Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Eect,
or Both?" Journal of International Economics, 47, 1{25.
Bernard, A. B., J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2007a): \Firms in
International Trade," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 105{130.
Bernard, A. B., S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2007b): \Comparative Advantage and
Heterogeneous Firms," Review of Economic Studies, 74, 31{66.
Bond, E., J. R. Tybout, and H. Utar (2008): \Credit Rationing, Risk Aversion, and Indus-
trial Evolution in Developing Countries," Working Paper 14116, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Broda, C. and D. E. Weinstein (2006): \Globalization and the Gains from Variety," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121, 541{585.
Buch, C., J. Doepke, and H. Strotmann (2009): \Does Export Openness Increase Firm-Level
Volatility," The World Economy, 32, 531{551.
Caballero, R. J. (1991): \On the Sign of the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship," American
Economic Review, 81, 279{288.
||| (1993): \On the Dynamics of Aggregate Investment," in Striving for Growth After Adjust-
ment { The Role of Capital Formation, ed. by L. Serven and A. Solimano, Washington, DC:
World Bank.
||| (1999): \Aggregate Investment," in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. Taylor and
M. Woodford, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Clark, P. B. (1973): \Uncertainty in the Exchange Rate and the Level of International Trade,"
Western Economic Journal, 11, 302{313.
Comin, D. and T. Philippon (2005): \The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Conse-
quences," American Economic Review, 91, 1286{1310.
Cooley, T. and V. Quadrini (2001): \Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics," American
Economic Review, 91, 1286{1310.
Cooper, R. W. and J. C. Haltiwanger (2006): \On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs,"
Review of Economic Studies, 73, 611{633.
Das, S., M. J. Roberts, and J. R. Tybout (2007): \Market Entry Costs, Producer Hetero-
geneity and Export Dynamics," Econometrica, 75, 837{873.
25di Giovanni, J. and A. Levchenko (2009): \Trade Openness and Volatility," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 91, 558{585.
Doms, M. and T. Dunne (1998): \Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manufacturing Plants,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 409{429.
Donnenfeld, S. and I. Zilcha (1991): \Pricing of Exports and Exchange Rate Uncertainty,"
International Economic Review, 32, 1009{1022.
Eaton, J., M. Eslava, M. Kugler, and J. R. Tybout (2008): \The Margins of Entry into
Export Markets: Evidence from Colombia," in The Organization of Firms in the Global Economy,
ed. by D. Marin and T. Verdier, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Eldor, R. and I. Zilcha (1987): \Discriminating Monopoly, Forward Markets and International
Trade," International Economic Review, 28, 459{468.
Gelos, G. and A. Isgut (2001): \Fixed Capital Adjustment: Is Latin America Dierent?"
Review of Economics and Statistics, 83, 717{726.
Hirsch, S. and B. Lev (1971): \Sales Stabilization Through Export Diversication," Review of
Economics and Statistics, 53, 270{277.
Iacovone, L. and B. S. Javorcik (2009): \Shipping the Good Tequila Out? Investment,
Domestic Unit Values and Entry of Multi-Product Plants into Export Markets," Manuscript,
University of Oxford.
Khan, A. and J. K. Thomas (2008): \Idiosyncratic Shocks and the Role of Nonconvexities in
Plant & Aggregate Investment Dynamics," Econometrica, 76, 395{436.
Maloney, W. F. and R. R. Azevedo (1995): \Trade Reform, Uncertainty and Export Promo-
tion: Mexico 1982-1988," Journal of Development Economics, 48, 67{89.
Moskowitz, T. and A. Vissing-Jrgensen (2002): \The Returns to Entrepreneurial Invest-
ment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?" American Economic Review, 92, 745{778.
Ria~ no, A. (2010): \The Decision to Export and the Volatility of Sales," Working Paper 2010/12,
Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy (GEP).
Roberts, M. J. and J. R. Tybout (1996): Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries: Micro
Patterns of Turnover, Productivity and Market Structure, New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
||| (1997): \The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk
Costs," American Economic Review, 87, 545{564.
Ruhl, K. J. and J. L. Willis (2008): \New Exporter Dynamics," Manuscript, NYU.
Suwantaradon, R. (2008): \Financial Frictions and International Trade," Manuscript, University
of Minnesota.
Tauchen, G. (1986): \Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vector Au-
toregressions," Economics Letters, 20, 177{181.
26Vannoorenberghe, G. (2010): \Firm-level Volatility and Exports," Manuscript, Tilburg Uni-
versity.
Veracierto, M. L. (2002): \Plant Level Irreversible Investment and Equilibrium Business Cy-
cles," American Economic Review, 92, 181{197.
27